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The neighborhood of Roxbury is Boston’s ghetto. Roxbury is the center o f 
Boston’s black community, and of a growing Latino community. Roxbury is 
also the economically poorest neighborhood in Boston, with a per capita 
incom e only two-thirds of the Boston average in 1980.1 Over the past ten 
years, there has been a tug-of-war between two insurgent strategies for 
community development in Boston’s poor and working-class communities 
in general and in Roxbury in particular. Both strategies are left populist, 
but there the similarity ends. One approach is a narrow version of populism 
that we call redistributive populism, which suppresses nonclass differences 
such as that o f race, seeks to unite “ the people”  around a least-common- 
denominator program based on traditional ideology, and holds out redistribu­
tion o f resources as the central goal. The second approach, transformative 
populism, differs markedly: It emphasizes and even celebrates diversity as 
well as unity, explicitly introduces derived ideology in a process of mutual 
education o f coalition members, and targets as its central goal the transfor­
mation of consciousness through empowerment.
W e use a case study of community development in Roxbury to weigh the
Mauricio Gaston passed away in 1986. He was not directly involved in the analysis of 
populism presented in this paper. However, the main source of data for the paper is a 
detailed case study of the Roxbury community that Gaston conducted with Kennedy over a 
period of years. We dedicate the paper to his memory and his vision. We would like to thank 
Jim Green, Gus Newport, Charlotte Ryan, Bob Terrell, Chuck Turner, and especially Mel 
King for numerous discussions (including comments on earlier drafts from Green, King, and 
Ryan) that influenced our thinking as reflected in this paper. The opinions expressed are 
our own, however, and do not necessarily reflect those of any of these people.
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merits o f the two populist approaches. W e argue that transformative popu­
lism is a superior strategy for achieving progressive goals related to commu­
nity development, including thé goal of redistribution. This superiority is 
especially evident in communities o f color, as the case of Roxbury illus­
trates. W e offer a limited comparison between the two strategies, but our 
main emphasis is on the innovative contributions o f  transformative populism 
as they have emerged in Roxbury’s community struggles over the past several 
years. The task o f comparison is complicated by the fact that a redistributive 
populist leader, Raymond Flynn, was elected mayor o f Boston in 1983 and 
again in 1987. Thus, redistributive populism has held a piece of state power 
(in this case, on the municipal level) in recent years, while transformative 
populism has remained a movement in opposition.2
W e present the case in five steps. First, we summarize the history of 
Boston and Roxbury that has created the context for current community 
development struggles. Second, we sketch the two populist strategies as 
they have developed in Boston. Both strategies, we argue, are responses to 
the class-community dilemma— the problem that important aspects of class 
oppression are experienced by people as members of multiclass communi­
ties. Third, we contrast the ways in which the two populisms have dealt 
with the relationship between traditional ideology— the “common sense”  
that people bring to daily life— and derived ideology— conscious left ideol­
ogy. Fourth, we describe how Boston’s redistributive and transformative 
populist movements have approached the state, in particular the local 
state, which has been the arena for important conflicts over community 
development. Finally, we offer brief conclusions.
Boston and Roxbury: From Disinvestment to
Displacement
The need for community development in Roxbury follows from a thirty-year 
history o f disinvestment. Roxbury has experienced tremendous losses of 
housing and industry at the hands of the market, and added assaults at the 
hands o f the state, through urban renewal and highway clearance. In one 
area of the neighborhood, known locally as the “ Bermuda triangle,”  70 
percent of the housing stock was lost to abandonment and arson in two 
decades. All the signs of intense poverty are evident in Roxbury: high 
unemployment, low participation in the labor force, low educational levels,
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a high crime rate, flourishing drug traffic, a high dropout rate from school, 
and a high rate of teenage pregnancy. Some of Roxbury’s census tracts are 
among the poorest in the country, on a par with the poorest counties in 
Mississippi and with Indian reservations in the western United States.
To a large extent, the devastation of Roxbury was a by-product of the 
revitalization of Boston. Forty years ago, Boston was one of the most econom­
ically depressed cities of the Frostbelt. In the intervening decades, Boston 
has been transformed into a regional and even national center of services 
and finance. This economic transformation was facilitated by major highway 
construction and one o f the most vigorous urban renewal programs in the 
country, orchestrated by the Boston Redevelopment Authority (BRA).
But Boston’s economic renaissance entailed a three-pronged attack on 
Roxbury’s well-being. First, downtown investment came at the expense of 
investment in poor communities and particularly communities of color. 
Neighborhoods like Roxbury were “ redlined”  by the banks. Roxbury proper­
ties were overassessed for tax purposes (until tax laws changed in 1982) and 
denied services in a deliberate policy of neighborhood “ triage,”  whereas 
downtown developers were given tax breaks and city services were concen­
trated on developing downtown areas. Second, the booming service indus­
tries created a much more polarized labor market than the manufacturing 
and transport industries they replaced. People of color were, and are, largely 
confined to very-low-wage jobs in the hotels, hospitals, restaurants, and 
stores that constituted much of “ New Boston’s” economy. Third, Boston’s 
programs o f highway construction and urban renewal physically destroyed 
much o f Roxbury. For example, highway planners working on a new South­
west Expressway (1-95) and Inner Belt circumferential road managed to cut 
a broad swath through industrial, commercial, and residential buildings in 
Lower Roxbury and along Columbus Avenue, a major Roxbury artery, before 
a popular movement stopped construction. Major urban renewal projects in 
Madison Park and Washington Park resulted in massive demolition of 
housing and displacement, despite the construction and renovation of subsi­
dized housing.
Today, investment in downtown Boston has almost reached its physical 
limits. But pressure for investment continues, posing a new threat of dis­
placement for outlying neighborhoods such as Roxbury. The pressure for 
investment is due both to the demands of capital and to the fiscal crisis of 
the local state, exacerbated by a statewide tax-cutting referendum passed 
in 1979. Roxbury’ s large amounts of publicly held land, its location only 
minutes from downtown, and its transportation connections to downtown
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make it an ideal new turf for capital. And indeed, since 1985, BRA has 
been nursing a number of development plans for Roxbury, including the 
$750 million Dudley Square Plan, bringing together twenty-one developers 
to redevelop the commercial and cultural center of Roxbury. Although the 
development plans are posed in terms of the “ revitalization”  of Roxbury, 
they are likely to lead to a massive displacement of current residents (Gaston 
and Kennedy 1987). Even the simple announcement of the plans has 
caused the displacement of current residents by speculators engaging in 
blockbusting, speculative purchases, and even arson.
Roxbury’s cycle from disinvestment to impending displacement repre­
sents, in a particularly extreme form, the problems faced by all of Boston’s 
low-income neighborhoods. To some extent, all these neighborhoods have 
suffered from neglect, and to some extent all of them are now at risk from 
the overflow of downtown development. In fact, this cycle typifies low- 
income urban neighborhoods across the country, although other neighbor­
hoods occupy different points in the cycle. Thus the challenge facing 
Roxbury activists is a universal one: how to develop the community in a 
way that serves the people that make up the community, instead of displacing 
them.
Class, Race, and Community: Two Populist Responses
Community development in low-income communities requires directing and 
harnessing private and public investment. It pits poor and working people 
against capital in a class conflict. But this class conflict is played out and 
experienced at the level of the community. Community members perceive 
a variety of forces, both impersonal (e.g., bank redlining) and personal 
(e.g., slumlords) that threaten their community. The embattled community 
includes landlords and business owners as well as unemployed people, 
welfare recipients, and people living from hustles, not just “ pure”  proletari­
ans. Organizers must find ways to develop and link community-based identi­
ties and struggles in a fashion that challenges capital. This is the class- 
community dilemma, as defined by Posner in the Introduction to this volume.
But, as Jennings points out in Chapter 5, there is another dimension to 
the dilemma: race. Race adds complexity to the situation on two levels. For 
one thing, racial distinctions color the relationship of capital to a given 
community. Capital as employer seeks to maintain communities as stable
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sites for the reproduction of the labor force, but seeks to limit community 
stability and cohesion to the extent that this cohesion serves as a basis 
for mobilization. Capital as user of physical space balances preserving 
communities within given neighborhoods as sources of income flows (rent, 
interest, profits) against displacing communities in order to convert the 
space to more profitable uses. In communities of color, both balances are 
tipped further toward instability. Much of the black and Latino labor force 
falls into a secondary labor market where flexibility, rather than stability, 
is at a premium, or even into the labor reserve. And because communities 
o f color tend to be poor, current income flows to capital from these communi­
ties are small, making alternative land uses more attractive.
At a second level, race affects the possibilities for political mobilization. 
Where neighborhoods are relatively segregated, as in Boston, racial identi­
ties can foster unity within communities, but division among them. Where 
neighborhoods are mixed, racial splits can fracture coalitions within a 
community. Given these effects of racial divisions, and given the concentra­
tion o f people o f color in the inner cities of the United States, the class- 
community dilemma often becomes a class—race—community dilemma.
In Boston, community activists have responded to this dilemma with two 
divergent strategies. Both strategies are left populist; they seek to unite “ the 
common people”  to do battle with the forces of corporate greed, real estate 
speculation, and government indifference or corruption. In both cases, the 
class content o f the strategy is implicit, not explicit. But the two populisms 
are quite distinct, particularly regarding the racial dimension of the di­
lemma.
The first strategy is what we call redistributive populism. Redistributive 
populism builds unity by emphasizing what people have in common, and 
downplaying or even overlooking differences such as race. Redistributive 
populists take an integrationist or assimilationist view of race, arguing that 
racial divisions will fade into insignificance as poor and working people 
pursue common goals. The strategy also assumes that people will only 
change their views incrementally, through participation in struggles in which 
they have already taken sides. Redistributive populists avoid raising issues 
that pose broad challenges to their constituency’s world views, or proposing 
struggles that their constituents are not already committed to. Such populists 
value community organization as a means to the end of redistribution of 
resources and economic justice. In general, redistributive populists also 
hold the goal o f transforming people’s world views and relationships to one
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another, but they see this as a long-term goal to be achieved as a by-product 
o f the accumulation o f short-term redistributive struggles.
Although redistributive populism as we have described it is an ideal 
type, we believe that most of the new populism, as defined by Evans and 
Boyte (1986) and others, can be classified within this approach. In Boston, 
the redistributive populist coalition ranges from the Fair Share grouping of 
progressive community organizations to a variety of elected and appointed 
officials who see themselves in the tradition o f Boston’s populist James 
Michael Curley, who was repeatedly elected mayor earlier in this century. 
White Irish populist politician Ray Flynn, along with his campaign organiza­
tion before the 1983 mayoral election, and his staff once he became mayor—  
including many Fair Share activists— has led redistributive populism to 
electoral victory in Boston.
The second strategy is transformative populism. Transformative populism 
emphasizes diversity as well as unity. Transformative populists seek to unite 
people based on their common oppression, but also seek to use the resulting 
coalition to battle each group’s distinct oppression. In this strategy, people 
must learn not only from their own struggles but from the struggles of 
others— and therefore organizers confront coalition members with issues 
designed to stretch the members’ world views. Instead of expecting and 
working for the disappearance of distinctions such as race, transformative 
populists project a “ salad bowl”  model of the good community in which 
differences are preserved and valued. Transformative populism views com­
munity organization— and the resulting transformation of people’s con­
sciousness— as an end in itself as well as a means toward redistribution. 
Even in the short term, the goal is liberation, not simply economic justice.
Transformative populism has a strong base in Boston, particularly in 
Roxbury. The black populist Mel King and his supporters, who formed the 
Boston Rainbow Coalition after King lost the 1983 mayoral election, make 
up the electoral arm of transformative populism in Boston. A variety of 
community organizations, many of them grouped in Boston’s Community 
Control Coalition, also espouse some form of transformative populism.
The difference between the two populisms was thrown into sharp relief 
during the 1983 mayoral race, when Flynn and King ran against each other. 
The difference between the political histories of the two candidates speaks 
volumes. Both were Boston natives of working-class parents. But their routes 
to the mayoral candidacy were utterly different. Flynn became a state 
representative from white, largely Irish South Boston by combining an
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appeal to the economic underdog, which has mobilized Boston’s Irish since 
the days o f  Mayor James Michael Curley, with extreme social conservatism. 
Flynn sponsored antiabortion legislation and helped lead the movement 
against court-ordered school desegregation. Flynn went on to join the Boston 
City C ouncil, and garnered the top vote totals in the 1981 council election 
by broadening his economic appeal— stressing affordable housing and culti­
vating his ties to organized labor— without moderating his positions on 
social issues.
King, in contrast, rose to prominence as a community activist and then 
state representative from the integrated, largely black South End. Although 
he initially focused on neighborhood issues such as street gangs, school 
desegregation, employment discrimination, and affordable housing, King 
soon becam e a leading advocate on a wide range of issues including women’s 
liberation, gay liberation, peace, and opposition to U.S. intervention abroad. 
King’s legislative initiatives ranged from the construction of a community 
development finance apparatus to the divestment of Massachusetts pension 
funds from companies doing business with South Africa.
To the surprise of virtually all political observers, these two candidates 
became front-runners and then finalists in the 1983 mayoral race. Two 
populist groupings coalesced around the candidates. Flynn sharpened his 
image as a populist, proclaiming that the issue of the election was the 
struggle between the neighborhoods and a greedy “ downtown.”  He shifted 
his stands on social issues somewhat— for example, avowing support for the 
Equal Rights Amendment— while avoiding any shifts that might alienate 
his base in South Boston and other socially conservative white neighbor­
hoods. The progressives who joined Flynn’s campaign believed that it 
was essential to build a coalition that brought in the white working-class 
communities that make up the majority of Boston’s population, even if this 
meant setting aside a whole range of “ noneconomic”  issues. This coalition 
was almost entirely white, although there were some exceptions— for exam­
ple, a Fair Share chapter from the black neighborhood of Mattapan signed 
on.
King also staked out a populist campaign, using such slogans as “ We 
may have come here on different ships, but we’re all in the same boat 
now.”  He made a particular effort to reach out to white working-class 
neighborhoods on issues of housing, jobs, and development. But, he contin­
ued to stress noneconomic issues, from racism to gay rights. As a result, he 
attracted active supporters from a wide range of communities and move­
ments: blacks, Latinos, Asians, gays and lesbians, feminists, peace activ­
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ists, and housing activists, among others. The result was the Rainbow 
Coalition, a term coined by King a year before Jesse Jackson adopted it. 
On the left, King attracted those who embraced what we call transformative 
populism— those who saw addressing noneconomic issues as the key to an 
effective populist coalition.
The most striking difference between the two campaigns was on the issue 
of race. Boston has long been a racially polarized city, and that polarization 
has been especially public and violent since the 1974 court-ordered school 
desegregation. But Flynn asserted in a television debate that “ the real 
problem is economic discrimination,”  adding that “ there are poor whites 
and blacks who do not have access to the political structure in this city.” 
He insisted that the problems of white South Boston and black and Latino 
Roxbury were identical. King, in contrast, targeted racism as a serious 
problem in its own right and challenged whites and blacks to confront the 
problem.
Flynn won the election. Although King won 95 percent of the black vote, 
67 percent of the Latino vote, and 20 percent of the white vote, this amounted 
to only one-third of Boston’s mainly white electorate. Redistributive popu­
lism defeated transformative populism at the polls. But in the years since 
the election, black, Latino, Asian, and white activists have continued to 
nurture transformative populism. And in the recent struggles over commu­
nity development in Roxbury, the. contributions o f transformative populism 
have become increasingly clear.
Of the dozens of groups working on community development in Roxbury, 
a half dozen— with overlapping personnel— work within a transformative 
populist framework. Because o f the imminent threat o f displacement, the 
transformative populists have focused on organizing for community control 
over the planning process and specifically over land use. But the groups 
have undertaken this organizing at many different levels. Certain groups, 
such as the Dudley Street Neighborhood Initiative and the Washington 
Street Corridor Coalition, target community control over development in 
areas that cross conventional neighborhood boundaries. The Greater Rox­
bury Neighborhood Authority (GRNA) is attempting to establish democratic 
community control over development in all of Roxbury (Gaston and Kennedy 
1987). A variety of groups, including the Greater Roxbury Incorporation 
Project (GRIP) and Project FATE (Focusing Attitudes Toward Empower­
ment) have campaigned for referenda proposing that Roxbury incorporate 
as the separate city of Mandela, independent of Boston (Kennedy and Tilly 
1987). The Center for Community Action trains organizers of color and
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sponsors community forums. Most of these groups are connected to citywide 
coalitions: the electoral Rainbow Coalition, and the Coalition for Community 
Control o f Development, initiated by the GRNA and now including groups 
from all but two of Boston’s major neighborhoods. The struggles led by these 
groups have highlighted two areas of difference between the two populist 
strategies: ideology and the role of the state.
The Dilemma of Ideology
In addition to the class-community dilemma, Posner in her introduction to 
this volume identifies the dilemma of the tension between traditional ideol­
ogy and derived ideology— between common sense and critical analysis. As 
noted in the previous section, the two populisms approach this tension in 
different ways.
Redistributive populism calls for uniting people around traditional ideol­
ogy. In practice, this leads to an ideological dichotomy. The organizers of 
redistributive populist movements are generally leftists, motivated by de­
rived ideology.4 But they mobilize their constituency using much more 
limited discourses that reflect “ where people are at.”  Once more, the 
example o f racism provides an apt illustration.
Charlotte Ryan, a community organizer in the racially mixed Boston 
neighborhood o f Dorchester, was interviewed by Green (1984). She com­
mented (in Green’s paraphrase): “ While many individual organizers in Fair 
Share were personally concerned with fighting racism, they did so in a 
private way. . . .  By taking a strictly economic approach to problems that 
would yield ‘quick victories,’ ‘ they ignored and sometimes denied the racial 
component o f issues’ ”  (p. 26). This dichotomy between privately held 
and publicly expressed views implies a certain elitism on the part of the 
organizers.
Mel King pointed out the problem in addressing a white Dorchester 
community meeting during the mayoral campaign: “ Look, the other candi­
dates won’t come here and talk to you about the problem of race. And that’s 
because they don’t respect you enough to think you can deal with the issue”  
(Green 1984, 30).
By pulling people together using traditional ideology, redistributive popu­
lists build a broader coalition than might otherwise be possible in the short
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run. But the coalition is riven by hidden conflicts. To hold the coalition 
together, redistributive populist leaders— even those who hold radical, 
transformative views— constantly defer transformative goals. The pressure 
to maintain and broaden the coalition leads inexorably to politics founded 
on the least common denominator.
Transformative populists, in contrast, explicitly attempt to bridge the gap 
between traditional and derived ideology. But how? The recent organizing in 
Roxbury provides some answers.
It is important to note that even redistributive populist organizing in 
black and Latino Roxbury could not take the same form as organizing in 
white areas o f Dorchester. Whereas ignoring race may be expedient in parts 
of Dorchester, it is impossible in Roxbury. Thus the functional equivalent 
o f an “ economic fair share”  approach in Roxbury would be a “ racial fair 
share”  approach: an assimilationist strategy aimed at obtaining more re­
sources for blacks and Latinos.
But some transformative populist Roxbury activists have moved beyond 
this redistributive approach in several ways. First, they have linked Roxbury 
residents’ immediate experiences as members o f a subordinate racial group 
to broader concepts and struggles: international issues, class analysis, and 
the importance of self-determination.
The main international connection drawn by Roxbury organizers is be­
tween the situation of blacks and Latinos in Roxbury and that o f blacks in 
South Africa. Boston’s Black United Front (BUF, an organization that no 
longer exists) set a precedent for solidarity in 1968. After riots in the wake 
of Martin Luther King’s assassination, the liberal Polaroid Corporation 
announced its intention to present BUF with a check to assist in rebuilding 
Roxbury. But Polaroid had been targeted by black activists for selling South 
Africa photographic equipment used to produce the hated “passes”  designed 
to control the movements of black South Africans. BUF held an all-night 
drop-in meeting to decide how to respond to Polaroid’s gift. The next day, 
as television cameras rolled, Chuck Turner (now director o f the Center for 
Community Action) accepted the check on behalf of the Black United Front, 
and immediately signed the check over to the African National Congress.
Activists have continued to voice the connection with South Africa and 
other anticolonial struggles. At the GRNA’s first mass meeting to develop 
strategies for effective opposition to the Boston Redevelopment Authority’s 
Dudley Square Plan, black public housing activist Regina Placid and black 
School Committee member Jean McGuire compared Boston’s treatment of
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Roxbury with South Africa’s bantustan policy. The Center for Community 
Action’ s organizer training curriculum routinely includes material on South 
Africa.
The need for class analysis is posed by class divisions within Boston’s 
black community. One example arose with BRA’s opening salvo in the 
current development plans for Roxbury, on a piece of land known as Parcel 
18. BRA, under the leadership of a Flynn-appointed director, Stephen 
Coyle, proposed high-rise office towers for the site, a plan that seems certain 
to lead to displacement in neighboring areas. In the face of community 
opposition, a Flynn-initiated “ redistributive”  solution gave a 30 percent 
share o f the project, as well as the downtown development to which this 
parcel is linked, to a coalition o f black, Latino, and Asian developers 
headed by a black-owned company. Flynn, in chorus with the local media, 
stressed the fact that this was the first time in Boston that minority developers 
would share in Boston’s downtown development boom. Is this community 
control over development? No, answered GRNA and other groups. Com­
mented GRN A’s Bob Terrell, “ It’s nice that [black] individuals have mobility 
from Boston’s investment boom, but the masses of black folks don’t. . . . 
To move everybody forward, we need community control”  (Kennedy and 
Tilly 1987, 17).
Roxbury’s transformative populists project an agenda based on self- 
determination, not assimilation (see Chapter 5 for further discussion of the 
importance of this distinction). The most striking instance of this stand arose 
with the debate over the 1986 “ Mandela”  ballot proposal to incorporate 
Roxbury as an independent city. From the standpoint of the redistributive 
populists in the Flynn administration and the black leaders they mobilized 
against incorporation, this proposal was not only racially divisive but insane. 
Roxbury residents would be staking claim to the most disinvested, economi­
cally barren parts of Boston. But transformative populists, including GRIP, 
GRNA, Mel King, and others, saw the matter differently. They recognized 
that Roxbury was ripe for reinvestment and that community wealth— the 
transformative potential o f a community of people— was largely untapped. 
Transformative populists concluded that incorporation would provide a lever 
for community control over the potential flood of new investment, as well as 
more effective utilization of existing resources, both human and material. 
Liberal critics charged that the Mandela advocates’ slogan of “ Yes we stay; 
no we go”  was deceptive, given that a yes vote favored the separation of 
Roxbury from Boston. But, in fact, the slogan served to popularize the 
idea that self-determination was the only alternative to displacement—
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and helped to win over the one-quarter of Roxbury voters who eventually 
supported the referendum (Kennedy and Tilly 1987).
A second element of the transformative populist Roxbury organizers’ 
approach to the dilemma of ideology is the recognition that the relationship 
between derived and traditional ideology runs in both directions. Activists 
armed with a left ideology have something to teach their constituents, but 
they also have something to learn from them.
Recent Roxbury community development struggles yield examples of 
both aspects. On the one hand, GRNA activists seized on the theory of 
uneven development and of cycles of disinvestment and reinvestment (as 
described earlier in this paper), and translated it into the popular notion 
that “ Roxbury already paid for the downtown boom; now we’re owed.”  This 
insight— far from obvious to the residents of an impoverished neighbor­
hood— has become commonplace for those involved in Roxbury’ s commu­
nity development movement.
On the other hand, a group of mainly white left housing experts (including 
author Kennedy), who had historically opposed homeownership because it 
atomizes communities and promotes a petty bourgeois “ investor”  mentality, 
were forced to reevaluate their position by the insistent support of Roxbury 
residents for homeownership. The result of discussions among intellectuals 
and activists was a program for nonspeculative homeownership, which 
maintains security of tenure and the right to alter one’s living space physi­
cally but places controls on resale. In turn, Roxbury groups have begun to 
implement parts of the program as they develop housing (Stone 1986).
This two-way ideological street begins to break down the elitism implicit 
in the redistributive populist approach. Respecting ordinary people enough 
to believe that they can change their world view when exposed to new ideas 
means respecting them enough to believe that they see important parts of 
reality that the left does not.
A final contribution of Roxbury’s organizers to solving the dilemma of 
ideology is their adoption of a broad concept of empowerment, emphasizing 
process as well as product. For redistributive populists, the criterion for 
success in the foreseeable future is in fact redistribution: How effective are 
community groups at redirecting resources toward their communities? In 
order to maintain momentum and keep people involved, these populists 
pursue what organizer Ryan calls “ quick victories,”  believing that education 
will spontaneously occur as a by-product. Their long-term vision rests on 
the belief that enough redistributive victories will lead to a transformation of 
consciousness. Roxbury’s transformative populist organizers instead define
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empowerment in terms o f a change in mass consciousness— “ making a 
break from a dependency model to work on what would ultimately be an 
interdependency model,”  as Mel King has put it. Thus these organizers 
seek to cultivate a patient, long-term view of struggle. In this view, building 
a unit o f low-income housing or improving trash pickup are victories, but 
adding new groups to a coalition or popularizing a radical analysis of 
development may be even more important victories. This difference in view 
spills over to conflicting populist views o f the role of the state, and it is to 
this that we turn next.
The Role o f the State
The disjuncture between community-based mobilization and societywide 
transformation arises most sharply when we consider the role of the national 
state, as Posner points out in her introduction to this volume. But a smaller 
version o f this dilemma is played out at the local level. Community develop­
ment struggles in Roxbury have most directly involved Boston’s municipal 
government.
It would be overstating the case to claim that redistributive populists 
hold local power in Boston. The power of the mayor is hemmed in by that 
o f other elected officials, such as members of the City Council and The 
School Committee; appointed officials such as BRA’s board o f directors; 
and a vast bureaucracy, largely staffed by holdovers from former mayor 
Kevin White’s liberal but hardly populist regime. Even so, the mayor 
occupies an extremely powerful position in Boston. Furthermore, Mayor 
Flynn has appointed avowed populists— in many cases, former organizers 
from Fair Share or other organizations— to key leadership positions in the 
bureaucracy. And substantial minorities in both the City Council and the 
School Committee are populists of various stripes.
Thus, when we contrast the redistributive and transformative populist 
approaches to the local government, we are making an asymmetrical compar­
ison between redistributive populists largely within and working through 
the local government and transformative populists chiefly located outside 
the local government. Within the limits of this comparison, recent struggles 
over the role o f local government in Roxbury have reproduced the split 
between redistribution and transformation that has come up repeatedly in 
this paper.
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The contrast is sharp. Flynn’s redistributive populists are sincerely 
committed to redistributing wealth. But they balk at redistributing power—  
the power to plan and to control land use. They seek to use the power of 
government to provide a set of material benefits— chiefly housing and jobs—  
for low-income people, but not to change the power relations between the 
government and low-income people. Redistributive populists have proven 
unwilling to encourage a movement that challenges the local government 
as well as supports its progressive initiatives. Their vision of community 
development is a narrowly economic one, measuring development by the 
number o f housing units, jobs, or dollars. In short, the redistributive popu­
lists in power emphasize representation, not participation. There are two 
reasons for this emphasis. First, it appears to be the most “ efficient”  way 
to achieve redistributive goals. Thus, Flynn administration officials argue 
that militant movements making broad demands jeopardize the limited 
redistributive compromises that are possible. These officials espouse the 
“ politics of the possible.”  Second, minimizing mobilization and participation 
lessens the risk that more conservative elements of the populist coalition 
will actively oppose progressive initiatives. When city officials plan reforms 
that go beyond the basis of the coalition— a recent example is integrating 
public housing in predominantly white areas o f Boston— it is easier to carry 
them out from above than to lead an ideological struggle that may split the 
coalition.
In contrast, Roxbury’s transformative populists hold that redistribution 
of power is essential. Activists have identified the politics of the possible 
as a trap. Organizer Chuck Turner recently commented, “ We have to look 
at how we define material reality.”  He noted that the mainstream view of 
Boston’s economic reality is founded on a scarcity of resources, but that if 
Roxbury’s residents accept this view and simply fight for their share of these 
scarce resources, they have already lost half the battle.
Transformative populists work with a broad definition of community 
development, akin to their broad definition of empowerment. They empha­
size that community development consists not simply of developing the 
neighborhood where people live but, first and foremost, of developing the 
people who make up a community. In the words of Tanzania’s Julius Nyerere,
A country, or a village, or a community cannot be developed. It can only 
develop itself. For real development means the development, the growth, of 
people. Roads, buildings, the increases o f crop output, and other things of 
this nature, are not development; they are only tools o f development. . . .  A
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man is developing himself when he grows, or earns, enough to provide decent 
conditions for himself and his family; he is not being developed if somebody 
gives him these things. A  man is developing himself when he improves his 
education— whatever he learns about; he is not being developed if he simply 
carries out orders from someone better educated than himself without under­
standing why those orders have been given. A man develops himself by 
jo in ing  in free discussion of a new venture, and participating in the subse­
quent discussion; he is not being developed if he is herded like an animal 
into the new venture. (Nyerere 1974)
Three examples demonstrate how these two views of the relation between 
state and movement have clashed. First, consider the struggle over federally 
subsidized housing. In 1985, a large amount of housing subsidized by the 
U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) in Boston, 
most o f it located in Roxbury and other black areas, was foreclosed. In the 
disposition of this housing, both the tenants and Mayor Flynn’s staff were 
concerned that the housing be repaired and remain subsidized. HUD’s 
representatives at the federal level seemed intent on selling off the housing 
to interests that would thwart these goals. Tenants in a number of these 
developments started a massive organizing drive; the mayor’s office began 
secret negotiations with HUD. Flynn’s populists-in-office reacted with dis­
may to the organizing. In fact, at one point a city official, a former tenant 
activist himself, essentially asked author Kennedy and her colleague Muri- 
cio Gaston to convince the tenants to stop organizing and making noise 
because it was threatening the negotiations. The tenant organizing contin­
ued, and eventually a deal was struck between the city and the federal 
government, but not without considerable ill feeling between community 
activists and city officials.
A second conflict is over the scope of community participation in develop­
ment planning. Compare the Flynn administration’s implementation of a 
“ community participation”  process in the Parcel 18 development project 
with GRNA’s demands for community participation. Parcel 18 is the largest 
development parcel in the Southwest Corridor, the land cleared for the 
never-built Southwest Expressway. The parcel enjoys a strategic location, 
adjacent to a new subway station on a recently relocated line, and near 
Dudley Square. Over a ten-year period, the Parcel 18 Task Force, a coalition 
o f tenants, community development corporations, black developers, agen­
cies, and abutting institutions, researched, planned, and explored develop­
ment alternatives for the site. After studying the various proposals for
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development articulated by the Task Force, BRA representatives literally 
said, ‘Thank you for your input,”  and proceeded to unveil a fully developed 
plan centered on two thirty-story office towers— a plan radically different 
from anything the task force had in mind. A black populist associated with 
the BRA explained the BRA’s position: The “ process”  is irrelevant as long 
as the “ development content”  benefits the community (Gaston and Kennedy 
1987).
GRNA made it clear that this sort of participation was not satisfactory. 
At a point when the city government sensed the level of popular support 
harnessed by GRNA, the BRA floated a proposal to create a Project Advisory 
Committee (PAC) for the Dudley area, with members appointed by the 
mayor and with only advisory power over development. GRNA countered 
by organizing constituency caucuses of small merchants, clergy, tenants, 
neighborhood associations, community development corporations, and other 
groups, identifying representatives from each sector, and presenting them 
for ratification at a Roxbury “ town meeting”  o f more than five hundred 
people, as a popularly elected “ interim PAC” that would serve until broader 
elections could be held.
City officials were forced to deal with the interim PAC. Negotiations 
between the interim PAC and the mayor’s office resulted in a twelve-point 
agreement that included an expanded interim PAC (including eight mayoral 
appointees in addition to the thirteen community-elected representatives), 
community elections for a PAC within a year, and substantial review and 
veto powers for the PAC. Mayor Flynn, put on the spot in front o f another 
community meeting of five hundred people, was forced to endorse the 
agreement, but the BRA’s board of directors (holdovers from the former 
mayor’s administration) refused to accept the PAC’s expanded powers. The 
matter remains unresolved, but interestingly, a number o f the mayor’s 
appointees to the PAC have joined a GRNA lawsuit to compel the BRA to 
meet the agreement.
A third point: Roxbury activists have stated that sometimes the best 
development plan is no plan at all— or at least no specific, immediate 
product. At a 1986 Boston housing conference bringing together progres­
sive housing professionals from City Hall, the universities, and community 
agencies, a top BRA official formulated what amounted to a “ trickle 
down”  approach to housing. He argued that since Boston has a severe 
housing crisis and the federal government is providing no funds to build 
affordable housing, the city government’s goal should be simply to build 
whatever housing it was possible to finance on city-owned vacant land
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in Roxbury. If only high-priced housing could be built, he reasoned, at 
least it would increase the supply of housing and bring down the price. 
Ken W ade, a GRNA leader, responded, “ No way! We should build 
nothing at all on that land until we can build what the community needs. 
W e should just put all that land in a community land trust, and when 
we can build affordable housing, that’s when we’ll do it.”  This develop­
ment strategy directly challenges the product-oriented “ politics of the 
possible.”
Redistributive populist attempts to redistribute resources without chang­
ing who has control over the resources are likely to backfire. In the case of 
the HUD-owned housing, it seems likely that in the absence of tenant 
mobilization, the city would have been less able to negotiate a favorable 
deal.5 As for the development of Roxbury, the Flynn administration’s haste 
to funnel development funds into the neighborhood has already led to 
displacement as land values around Dudley Square and the Southwest 
Corridor rise. Further development along the same lines will create new 
housing and jobs in the neighborhood of Roxbury, but a large part of the 
community o f people currently living in Roxbury will be displaced and 
therefore will not share in these resources.
Conclusion
This case study contrasts redistributive populism to transformative populism 
in the arena o f community development in a community of color. In our view, 
transformative populism has proven superior to redistributive populism as 
an approach to community development in this setting, and this superiority 
is likely to extend more broadly to other arenas of social change.
This judgment depends on one’s view of community development. 
Certainly if one defines community development primarily in terms of 
the development o f people, the transformative approach is more appro­
priate. But we would argue that even redistributive populism’s own stated 
goals— building a community-based movement for social change that can 
effectively carry out redistribution of resources— are better met by a 
transformative strategy. The evidence for this claim comes from the two 
strategies’ different approaches to the dilemma of ideology and to the 
role of the state.
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Redistributive populism is in some sense an “ easier”  strategy than 
transformative populism. Demands framed solely in terms of redistribution 
of resources are easier to formulate; broad support for such demands is easier 
to amass; “ quick victories”  are temptingly easier to claim.6 In addition, the 
entire approach can be more easily meshed with the timetable of electoral 
or legislative strategies. Indeed, left community organizers tend to fall back 
reflexively on the redistributive strategy because it is the path of least 
resistance— despite their long-term transformative goals.
But the ease of pursuing redistributive populism comes at a cost. Support 
for a narrowly redistributive movement may be broad, but it is shallow. 
Redistributive populism’s commitment to the use of least-common-denomi- 
nator traditional ideology leaves populist movements disarmed before the 
very real divisions of race, class, gender, and so on. Transformative popu­
lism’s insistence on understanding and valuing diversity, and on dealing 
with all kinds of inequality and injustice, not just the one type that affects 
the largest number of people in a community, may drive some potential 
supporters away, but it builds a popular consciousness that makes it more 
difficult to shatter or coopt a coalition. This is important even when organiz­
ing at the level of a single community— particularly a community of color, 
where the reality of racial divisions is unavoidable. The emphasis on dealing 
with diversity becomes even more crucial when building multicommunity 
coalitions that are diverse along racial and other lines. At a time when in 
the United States as a whole white poverty rates are declining but black and 
Latino poverty rates are increasing (Center for Budget and Policy Priorities 
1988), calling for “ the greatest good for the greatest number”  simply is not 
sufficient.
The transformative strategy requires placing one’s trust in the common 
people to wrestle with difficult issues and come to positions that may be at 
odds with their traditional world views. This trust also implies a willingness 
of organizers and intellectuals to learn from the people being organized, 
leading to creative solutions to seemingly intractable problems, and alterna­
tives to apparently unavoidable tradeoffs. In a situation where immediate 
material victories are severely constrained by economic and political forces, 
transformative populism’s emphasis on nurturing a long-term view and 
measuring success by movement building and consciousness raising can 
enable a community to sustain ambitious goals.
Transformative populists see the main progressive role of the state as 
empowering and building people’s movements, not simply presiding over a
3 2 0 Where the Action Is
fair redistribution of scarce resources. We do not claim that it is inevitable 
that redistributive populists in office will seek to suppress popular mobiliza­
tions, sacrifice long-run possibilities to achieve short-term material results, 
and avoid effective community participation— as redistributive populists in 
Boston’s Flynn administration have done. Nevertheless, the redistributive 
populist emphasis on product over process— redistribution rather than trans­
formation— makes them likely to fall into these patterns.
In general, without a movement toward community empowerment, a 
reform government lacks the popular mobilization necessary to carry out 
substantial, lasting redistribution. The government remains hemmed in by 
“ not enough money,”  unable to make more aggressive demands on capital 
or to stimulate self-help initiatives. The “ gifts”  from the city government to 
disadvantaged communities turn out to be small, poorly planned and deliv­
ered, and most likely temporary. In some cases, “ redistributive” assistance 
from a progressive-minded government can be downright destructive— as 
the development assistance directed toward Roxbury by the Flynn adminis­
tration has been.
Finally, a transformative populist approach is better equipped to confront 
the deep questions o f structural change that successful social movements 
must sooner or later answer. We believe that in order to achieve lasting 
change, a movement for the development of poor communities must 
question not only existing strategies for economic growth but the value 
o f growth as currently defined. It must challenge not only the policies 
o f current governments but the entire political system that rests on 
massive nonparticipation and an extremely restricted set of electoral 
choices. In doing so, it must link up with other movements concerned 
with these issues. While Roxbury’s transformative populists have only 
begun to scratch the surface of these problems, they and others like 
them seem more likely to come up with solutions than is a redistributive 
populist movement.
W e have coined the terms “ transformative”  and “ redistributive”  for 
this paper. Without using these names, most Boston activists sense the 
importance of the differences in approach we have outlined. Regardless of 
what terms are used, we believe it is important for activists in Boston 
and elsewhere to become conscious o f the distinction and to explicitly 
develop what we have called transformative populism. It is easy to fall 
into redistributive populism, and the clear understanding necessary to 
avoid this goes well beyond what this paper has to offer. The continued
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efforts of activists and intellectuals working together can make this 
understanding possible.
Notes
1. The boundaries of Roxbury are variously defined from one governmental 
agency to another and by different community organizations. We are generally 
referring to the 1980 Boston Neighborhood Statistical Areas 9 (North Dorchester/ 
Dudley), 30 (Franklin Field), 38 (Egleston Square), 52 (Highland Park), 53 (Lower 
Roxbury), 54 (Sav-Mor), and 55 (Washington Park). Per capita income in Roxbury 
in 1979 varied from a low in Lower Roxbury of 52%  of the citywide per capita 
income to a high of 73%  in Sav-Mor.
2 . Several readers o f earlier drafts o f this paper argued that we are “ too easy 
on the Flynn administration.”  W e would like to emphasize that this paper in no 
way constitutes an evaluation o f the accomplishments (or lack thereof) o f the Flynn 
administration or o f opposition groups. In order to pose the contradictions in the 
case most clearly we have assumed a best-case scenario for the Flynn administration 
and the broader movement it represents. The primary question posed is this: If 
what we are terming redistributive populists acted in good faith on the stated 
intentions o f their most progressive spokespeople, how would their strategy compare 
with the alternative transformative populist strategy?
3. Much o f this discussion draws on Green (1984).
4. According to a Flynn staffer, even Ray Flynn has confidentially identified 
himself as a socialist.
5. In a related example outside Roxbury, Flynn government officials proposed 
development o f housing on vacant city-owned land in the South End. The city 
officials initially stipulated that only 35%  of the housing be developed for low- and 
moderate-income residents, fearing that proposing a higher level o f affordability 
would arouse political opposition from middle-class South End residents and devel­
opers. Community activists responded by forming the Ad Hoc Housing Committee. 
Over opposition by city officials, they won a more participatory process. In the 
course o f  this process, the Ad Hoc Housing Committee built majority support—  
including most o f the representations o f  the South End’s middle class— for a formula 
o f  one-third low-incom e, one-third moderate income, and one-third market rate. 
The city belatedly endorsed the formula. Without the mobilization from below, city 
officials never would have gone beyond the original 35%  target, despite their 
avowed support for affordable housing.
6 . O f course, dogmatic left sloganeering is also easy; transformative populism 
must avoid this trap as well.
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